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Abstract
This study reports novel facts about the UK gender pay gap. We use a representative,
longitudinal and employer-employee linked dataset for the years 2002-16. Men’s average
log hourly wage was 22 points higher than women’s in this period. We find that 16% of this
raw pay gap is accounted for by estimated firm-specific wage effects. This is almost three
times the amount explained by the occupation differences between men and women. When
we decompose a preadjusted measure of the pay gap, we find that less than 1 percentage
point is accounted for by the allocation of men and women across high and low wage
firms. In other words, only a small share (6%) of what is traditionally referred to as the
‘unexplained’ part of the pay gap is in fact explained by the differences between men and
women in whom they work for.
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1 Introduction
The gap between the average hourly pay of men and women in the United Kingdom stood at 17.1%
in April 2018.1 In an attempt to address this inequality, UK law was recently changed such that all
British employers with 250 employees or more must annually publish their own gender pay gaps.2 This
study contributes to the literature on the pay differences between men and women by assessing what
role firm-specific wage premiums had in the UK’s pay gap between 2002 and 2016.
To do so, we estimate a wages model which allows for worker- and firm-specific fixed wage effects,
following the contributions of Abowd et al. (1999) and Abowd et al. (2002). In our analysis sample the
observed mean hourly pay gap (male minus female) among employees aged 25-64 was 22.3 log points.
We find that 16% of this gap is accounted for by estimated firm-specific wage effects, implying that men
have a greater tendency than women to work for firms which on average pay higher wage premiums to
their employees. To put this figure into perspective, the equivalent contribution from the fact that men
and women work in different occupations, which in turn have different wage premiums, is just 6%. The
vast majority of the pay gap is explained by the fixed characteristics of workers, which affect their wages
irrespective of what jobs they are in.
Using an application of the Gelbach (2016) decomposition, we take this analysis a step further and
ask how much of an observable-covariate-adjusted difference in the gender averages of log real hourly
pay is due to the distribution of workers over firms. In other words, we estimate the role of which
workers were employed by which firms in a measure of the gender wage gap which is preadjusted for
the influence of factors such as a worker’s age, tenure, occupation, industry sector and full-time status.
Out of an adjusted pay gap of 14.5 log points, an estimated share of just 6% is then contributed by the
conditional allocation of employees over firm-specific wage premiums.
A vast literature has studied the determinants of gender pay gaps (see for reviews Altonji and
Blank, 1999; Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2005; Blau and Kahn, 2017). Explanations for the
labour market differences between men and women are typically grouped into three broad categories:
productivity, preferences and discrimination, which are all interrelated (Altonji and Blank, 1999).
However, with the diminishing of gender gaps in education and labour market participation in the
majority of developed countries, the importance and focus on explanations from the first category,
especially human capital-based ones, has lessened. Nonetheless, pay gaps still persist and are pervasive.
More recent work has looked to gender differences in preferences and psychological attributes, and how
these impact on productivity, choices and beliefs (see for reviews Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Bertrand,
2011; Azmat and Petrongolo, 2014). The role of firms, in particular where men and women work, cuts
across these sets of explanations. Early work found that US women were more likely to work for low
1Excluding overtime, where the gap is measured as the ratio of the difference between male and female pay over male pay.
The preferred measure of the UK Government is median wages rather than the mean and excludes part-time workers. The
median gap for full-time employees was 8.6% in 2018. The median gap for all employees, including part-time, was 17.9% in
2018. Source: ONS, ASHE Total Table 1.6a, Hourly Pay excluding overtime; https://www.ons.gov.uk/...
2Legislation titled “The Equality Act 2010 (Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations 2017”;
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/... Public sector employers throughout the UK already had duties to report pay gaps,
following from the Equality Act 2010.
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wage firms than men, and vice versa regarding high wage firms (Blau, 1977; Groshen, 1991; Bayard
et al., 2003). More recent studies have found that low wage growth within an establishment for women
plays a bigger role in the US gender pay gap than how women are (not) sorted into high wage firms
(Goldin et al., 2017; Barth et al., 2017).
The only studies to have previously looked at the role of where UK men and women work, and
whether this could explain part of the overall pay gap, are by Mumford and Smith (2007, 2009). These
authors used cross-sectional data to disentangle the influence of observable employer and employee
characteristics. They showed that the proportions of women relative to men in occupations and
workplaces of different types did account for part of the UK gender pay gap. However, these studies,
as well as those which have looked at other countries using a similar method, were hampered by not
being able to simultaneously address the unobservable fixed heterogeneity over workers and firms in the
determination of wages, i.e. they lacked longitudinal employer-employee linked datasets. Therefore,
their results cannot be directly compared with what we find here.
Similarly, our main findings are not directly comparable with the majority of the recent UK-focused
gender pay gap literature, which has mostly used sources of longitudinal household survey data. This
literature could not control robustly for the potential influence of how male and female employees
were allocated across firm types, which could systematically differ by gender and be correlated with
other determinants of wages. It is plausible that omitting this factor, which generally explains a
significant fraction of overall UK wage variation, could have confounded previous results. For example,
in an up-to-date study, Costa Dias et al. (2018) demonstrate the importance of accumulated years
of work experience and working hours in determining pay gaps. They find that among UK college
graduates, the majority of the gender pay gap twenty years after the first childbirth can be explained
by differences in work experience, mostly through accumulated working hours. But it is well-known
that the measured returns to tenure and work experience are likely to be upwards biased unless the
unobserved worker-firm-match quality is controlled for (Topel, 1991). Our main findings show that the
way in which employees are assigned to firms can explain only a small fraction of the adjusted UK
hourly pay gap. Therefore, we add support to some of the previous conclusions about the determinants
of UK gender pay differences, which were based on household survey data from a similar period, but
which could not have addressed the potential influence of how workers were matched to firms in any
respect.
More direct comparisons of our main findings are possible with a few recent studies of the pay
gaps in other countries.3 In particular, Cardoso et al. (2016) (henceforth CGP) looked at how much
of the Portuguese hourly wage gap could be accounted for by the allocation of men and women over
establishments and job-titles. They found that these two factors could each explain around a fifth of
an adjusted measure of the Portuguese wage gap over three decades. Our methodological approach is
close to that of CGP, though we expand on it. We use the Gelbach decomposition to identify the role of
unobservable worker and firm fixed factors in the pay gap, after first adjusting for the influence of both
time-varying and fixed observable wage determinants, and not just the former as in the case of CPG.
3see Section 5.3 & Table 7 for a full comparison with these relevant studies.
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As the April 2018 deadline for large UK firms to publish their pay gaps approached and passed, there
was significant interest in and scrutiny of the reported figures among the British public and media.4 The
UK government stated that the new legislation’s motivation was to highlight gender pay inequality and
discrimination, and to encourage firms to tackle these issues within the workplace.5 Despite potentially
significant economic costs of the legislation, we could find no robust empirical evidence, representative
of the whole UK labour market, that showed the gender pay gap was not an issue of differences in pay
between firms, rather than within them.6 It will be impossible to address this evidence gap using the pay
gap data collected from firms under the new legislation. Quite simply, there is no robust way to address
how much of these pay gaps reported by firms, and the differences therein between firms, are explained
by workforce composition. Therefore with this paper, we address an important gap in the current UK
equalities policy evidence base, on whether requiring firms to publish their own pay gaps is relevant to
what explains the overall UK gender pay gap.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the data and our longitudinal
employer-employee sample construction; Section 3 outlines the methods used to decompose measures
of the gender pay gap. Section 4 presents the main results; Section 5 discusses the robustness of our
findings and compares these UK results with those from other countries; and Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The main data source is the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), 2002-16, which is each year
based on a 1% random sample of UK employees, drawn from HM Revenue and Customs Pay As You
Earn (PAYE) records, collected and administered by the Office for National Statistics. Questionnaires
are sent to employers, who are legally required to complete these with reference to payrolls for a period
in April. Because the randomness of the sample in every year is based on all the individuals having the
same last two-digits for their personal lifetime National Insurance number, this dataset can be viewed as
a panel of employees without attrition and with replacement.7
4See for example these articles, which appeared high on the BBC news website and featured among the most read
articles among visitors at that time: “Gender pay gap: More than 500 firms reveal their figures” (6 January, 2018;
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/...); “Gender pay gap: Men still earn more than women at most firms” (21 February, 2018;
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/...).
5See for example the joint Government Equalities Office and Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development guidance
document published for employers in December 2017: “GENDER PAY GAP: Closing it together - Actions for employers”;
https://www.gov.uk/....
6There have been several regulatory impact assessments on the policy proposal, since before the enactment of the Equality
Act 2010. For example, the Regulatory Impact Assessment of April 2016, relating to this new legislation, suggested estimates
of the net economic costs to private sector employers of £3.8million per annum (which figure was based on seemingly
conservative assumptions compared to the actual consultation responses published by and collected from businesses);
https://www.gov.uk/...
7A National Insurance number gives individuals the right to work in the UK and identifies them for income tax purposes.
The two main reasons why an individual might not be observed in some year of the ASHE are: either being truly non-employed,
or having changed employer between January and April. Since the survey questionnaires are in most cases sent in April to
the employer’s registered address from January PAYE records, workers who switch employers during these months are under
sampled. The panel goes back as far as 1968, though firm identifiers are generally unavailable before 2002.
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2.1 Analysis sample construction
Particularly valuable for our analysis are the longitudinal identifiers for individuals and enterprises
contained within the ASHE. We use the terms ‘firm’ and ‘enterprise’ synonymously. The latter in this
case is a specific administrative definition of UK employers, which could contain several local units
(or establishments). These identifiers allow us to construct a longitudinal, linked employer-employee
dataset, which contains the records of approximately 1% of the UK employee population in every year
between 2002 and 2016.8
We include only the main job observation of an individual in any year, which must not be at a trainee
or an apprentice level, and must not have incurred a loss of pay in the reference period for whatever
reason. To avoid some spurious derived hourly wage rates, we only keep observations with 1-100 basic
paid weekly hours, and drop any observations with missing values for gross weekly earnings. Our
analysis focuses on the hourly wage rate, which equals the ratio of employee gross weekly earnings to
the corresponding record of basic weekly paid hours, all excluding overtime. This measure includes
any incentive pay or premiums for working nights, weekends or during public holidays. We refer to
this simply as wages. We deflate the wages using the corresponding April values of the Consumer Price
Index (CPI), and all values are then presented in April 2002 prices.9
We only consider prime-working-age employees, aged 25-64, who have non-missing records of
earnings and hours. The ASHE does not contain any information on an individual’s education. We drop
observations under the age of 25, so that we only study the clear majority who would have completed
full-time education by this age in the UK. Therefore, any worker fixed wage effects estimated in our
regression models should account for most of the wage heterogeneity over employees associated with
human capital accumulation before they have begun to fully engage with the labour market. Our
analysis uses the following observable characteristics of employees and firms: gender, age (years),
tenure (completed consecutive years with a firm), whether a job is full- or part-time (thirty hours or
less), occupation, industry sector of the firm, whether or not the firm is in the private sector, employee
birth cohort (year) and the number of employees working for the firm. Details of these variables, their
discrete categories, and how some of these were derived, are all described in Appendix A. We drop the
small number of employee-year observations which have missing values for any of these variables. This
then gives us what we call the ‘Whole ASHE’ sample.
2.2 Descriptive summary
For all employees and each year in 2002-16, mean and median values of the raw (observed/unadjusted)
gender pay gap are shown in Figure 1. In the Whole ASHE sample, the mean value declined from around
28 log points in 2002 to 16 points in 2016. The median gap similarly declined throughout the period.10
8For further information on how we constructed this dataset from annual ASHE cross-sections, other adjustments made to
the data, and the details of some trimming (or cleaning) of the sample, see Appendix A.
9Obtained from UK National Statistics, accessed 24/4/2017.
10These levels and trends are similar to what one can obtain from UK official National Statistics aggregates, contained
historically within the ONS “Patterns of Pay” series; https://data.gov.uk/..., which is is based on the ASHE.
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FIGURE 1: Gaps between the mean and median log real hourly wage of UK men and women, 2002-2016
A. Mean B. Median
Notes.- author calculations using the ASHE 2002-16 and BHPS/USS 2002-2016, all employees aged 25-64. Pay excludes
overtime. Gap is male minus female. “Analysis sample” is an 87% sub-sample of the “Whole ASHE” and represents statistics
using only jobs in the largest connected set of workers and firms, i.e those used to generate the paper’s main results. See text
and Appendix A for further details of the sample construction. Shaded area represents an official UK recession.
Figure 1 also shows comparable pay gap statistics for what we call the ‘Analysis’ sample. This is
an 87% sub-sample of the Whole ASHE. It consists of the largest connected set of workers and firms.11
All our main results in this paper use the Analysis sample, since the method we apply only allows for
the comparison of any estimated firm-specific wage effects within a connected set of firms and workers.
The largest connected set contains 1.71 million employee-year observations, with 131,903 men and
124,501 women represented. The median and mean number of years that men and women appear as
employees in the sample are for both genders 10 and 9, respectively. The sample covers 86,779 different
firms, where 18,404 are present in 2002, and thereafter, approximately 4-6,000 thousand new firms
enter the sample in each subsequent year. The median, mean and standard deviation of the number of
employee-year observations per firm are 300-400, 1,815 and 3,910 respectively.12 Appendix Table A1
shows the distribution of the number of employers worked for by employees over the whole 2002-16
period. Just less than half (48%) of the men and women represented in the sample had only one employer
over this period, the majority had at least two employers and around a fifth had more than two.
Table 1 compares some descriptive statistics over employee-year observations between the Analysis
and Whole ASHE samples. The 87% sub-sample is similar in most regards, though as anticipated in the
largest connected set, the average firm size (actual number of employees) and its variance is higher. This
implies that larger firms are marginally over-represented in our analysis compared with the UK employee
population. There is also evidence of substantial gender segregation of employees across firms. For men
in the sample, at their firms the female employee share is on average just 31%. However, for women,
11Abowd et al. (2002) describe the concept of connectedness in this context as: “When a group of person and firms is
connected, the group contains all the workers who ever worked for any of the firms in the group and all the firms at which any
of the workers were ever employed.”
12Throughout the study, all reported median or percentile statistics are rounded to be consistent with the statistical disclosure
control policy of the UK Data Service, i.e. these reported statistics should not be viewed as precise values.
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the share of their coworkers who are female is 71%.13 The extent of gender segregation is greater in the
Whole ASHE sample, suggesting that smaller firms are substantially more gender segregated than larger
firms.
TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics for employees: comparison of the Analysis sub-sample and the Whole
ASHE, 2002-16
Analysis Whole ASHE
Male Female Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean ln real hourly wage (2002 prices) 2.44 2.21 2.41 2.20
Median ln real hourly wage 2.38 2.13 2.34 2.11
St. dev. of ln real hourly wage 0.55 0.49 0.55 0.48
Mean ln real weekly earnings 6.02 5.52 5.99 5.49
Share employed full-time 0.92 0.59 0.91 0.58
Mean usual weekly hours if full-time 38.5 36.8 38.7 36.9
Mean usual weekly hours if part-time 19.5 19.5 19.4 19.4
Share in private sector 0.71 0.48 0.74 0.53
Share female at firm 0.31 0.71 0.27 0.74
Mean age (years) 42.6 42.9 42.8 42.9
St. dev. of age 10.4 10.2 10.6 10.3
Mean firm size (n. of employees) 18,343 20,245 15,574 18,049
St. dev. of firm size 42,410 42,110 39,617 40,251
N 824,806 883,326 971,830 990,997
Notes.- author calculations using the ASHE 2002-16, all employees age 25-64. £2002. Pay and hours worked excludes
overtime. See Figure 1 and text for details of sample and variable construction.
Returning to Figure 1, both the mean and median pay gap in the Analysis sample are
consistently higher across all years than in the Whole ASHE sample, by approximately one log point.
Appendix Figure A1 shows that both male and female average pay are higher in the Analysis sample,
though more so for male pay. Figure 1b and Appendix Figure A1b also show pay gap series derived
using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS, 2002-08) and Understanding Society Survey (USS,
2009-16), using a method and sample selection as comparable as possible to our Whole ASHE measures
(see Appendix A). These other datasets, used widely in the literature (e.g. Costa Dias et al., 2018),
are top-coded, so we only compare median values. The household survey-based earnings data overall
provide gender pay statistics similar to the ASHE since 2002. But patterns over time within this period
do not closely match what we derive from the ASHE, nor what the ONS present as National Statistics
aggregates. Specifically, the median male real hourly wage from the BHPS increased more before the
2007-08 financial crisis than measured within the ASHE; and both male and female median real hourly
wages from the USS did not decline as far as they did in the ASHE following 2007-08, especially among
men.
13Mumford and Smith (2009) found similar statistics for the UK focusing on 2004 only.
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We also estimate the kernel densities of log real hourly wages for the male and female observations
in the Analysis sample, shown by Figure 2. The female wage distribution is more positively skewed
towards values of the UK’s real National Minimum Wage, whereas observations with very high hourly
rates of pay are dominated by men. Appendix Figure 2 demonstrates that the gender-specific wage
distributions are practically unchanged when we move between the Whole ASHE sample and the largest
connected set of employees and firms therein.
FIGURE 2: Male and female distributions of employee real hourly wages
Notes.- see Figure 1. £2002. Uses the “Analysis sample”. Both male and female kernel densities were estimated with a
bandwidth of one log point. The top and bottom one percent of male and female hourly earners are not displayed.
3 Method
First we estimate a so-called AKM-type wages model, which features both worker and firm fixed effects
(Abowd et al., 1999). We use this to look at how much of the raw wage differences between male
and female UK employees in 2002-16 are accounted for by firm-specific wage effects. We then go
a step further and apply a decomposition method suggested by Gelbach (2016). This method can
address the role in the pay gap of whom employees work for, after conditioning on, or adjusting for,
the influence of some observable worker, firm and job characteristics. In other words, it provides a
way to decompose what is traditionally know as the ‘adjusted’ or residual wage gap, typically estimated
using cross-sectional datasets, into contributions which can be addressed using longitudinal data. CGP
have identified and described thoroughly the usefulness of this method for studying the role of firm
fixed factors in the adjusted gender pay gap. Therefore, our treatment here is concise. However we
suggest one expansion on CGP. We emphasise that the Gelbach decomposition allows us to address
the observable fixed characteristics of workers and firms, such as birth cohort or industry sector, even
in an estimated wages model which includes fixed effects, before attributing the remaining pay gap to
unobservable fixed factors, such as worker preferences or firm productivity.
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The Gelbach decomposition quantifies how much of the change in some coefficient of interest, in
an estimated linear regression model, is due to adding further covariates to the model, without concern
for the order in which those covariates are added. In the same terminology used by Gelbach, the ‘Full’
model includes the coefficient of interest, which in our application is the marginal effect on wages of
gender, and a full set of covariates. Our AKM-type Full wages model is given by:
wit = x′itβ +αi+φJ(it)+ εit ,
or in stacked matrix notation as:
y = Xβ +Aα +Fφ +ε . (1)
In this equation, y gives an (Nx1) vector containing the natural logarithm of the real hourly wage, wit ,
for individual i in period t. For the remainder of the paper, any reference to ‘log’ wages concerns
wit . Similarly, any reference to a ‘pay (wage) gap’ concerns the difference in log real hourly wages
between men and women. The (Nxk) matrix X and the vector xit contain k time-varying covariates,
with associated (kx1) coefficient vector β . The (NxP) and (NxL) matrices A and F are designs for the
P workers and L firms covered by the model, respectively. The worker fixed effects, αi, are contained
within the (Px1) vector α . Similarly, the firm fixed effects, φJ(it), are contained in the Lx1 vector φ ,
where J is a function denoting whether worker i in period t is employed by firm j. Finally, the vector ε
contains the N error terms, εit , which are assumed to have the standard properties E [ε | X,A,F] = 0.
AKM-type models intrinsically concern firm switching. The worker fixed effects, αi, are
transferable, affecting an employee’s wages to the same degree wherever and whenever he works, and in
whatever job. The firm fixed effects, φJ(it), measure relative wage premiums, which employees receive
upon switching firms. The Full wages model then estimates the systematically higher or lower wages
that firms pay relative to other firms, for whatever reason. If such relative firm wage premiums do exist
in the labour market, we can ask whether or not men or women are disproportionately benefiting from
their existence, and if so, quantify their importance in terms of the gender pay gap. As per a Oaxaca-style







φ̂J(it)| i ∈ F
]
. (2)
To demonstrate our application of the Gelbach decomposition, it is useful if we re-write the Full
model as follows:
y = Xβ +gλ˜ +Wβw +Aα˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Aα
+Zβz +Fφ˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Fφ
+ε , (3)
where g contains a dummy variable for whether or not an individual is male, and λ˜ measures the wage
gap conditional on the other factors in the model. The (Nxp) and (Nxl) matrices W and Z contain
p and l time-invariant observable worker and firm characteristics, respectively. Therefore, α˜ and φ˜
measure the effects on employee wages of all unobserved (or residual) fixed worker and firm factors.
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But the coefficients contained in {λ˜ ,βw ,α˜ ,βz ,φ˜ } cannot be all separately identified using least squares
estimation of this single-equation model.
Still keeping to the terminology of Gelbach, the ‘Basic’ model omits the particular covariates whose
effects in the Full model on the estimated coefficient of interest we wish to account for, which here is the
observable-covariate-adjusted gender pay gap (henceforth referred to as the ‘adjusted gender pay gap’).
Our Basic wages model is given by:
wit = giλ + x˜′itβ˜ + eit ,
or in stacked matrix notation as:
y = gλ + X˜β˜ + e . (4)
The adjusted gender pay gap in (4) is given by the coefficient λ . The covariates are contained in the
(Nx [k+ p+ l])matrix X˜= [X,W,Z]. Although the effects of each factor in W and Z cannot be identified
in the single-equation Full model, this is not a good reason to exclude them from our Basic wages model.
In a standard exploration of the pay gap and estimation of a wages model, such as those which do
not use longitudinal employer-employee data, we would anticipate that time-invariant factors could be
significant, such as an individual’s birth cohort, or whether a job is in the private sector. This is the main
way in which we differ from the application of the Gelbach decomposition by CGP, who only included a
set of k time-varying covariates in their Basic model. The vector e contains the N error terms, eit , which
are again assumed to have standard properties.
The Gelbach decomposition is then applied by pre-multiplying components of the estimated version



















where I is the (NxN) identity matrix. Pre-multiplying some variable, contained within an (Nx1) vector,
by γ ′ computes the gender gap in the average values of that variable, conditional on the estimated linear
additive effects of any other variables contained within X˜: i.e. it ‘adjusts’ the observed gender gap. If we
replaced X˜ in (5) with a vector of 1’s, then pre-multiplying y by γ ′ would give the actual mean gender
pay gap observed in the data. Using (5), we can write the following decomposition equation for the
components of the adjusted pay gap:
γ ′y︸︷︷︸
δ̂y=λ̂ - Adjusted gender pay gap
= γ ′Aα̂︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ̂a - dist. worker effs
+ γ ′Fφ̂︸︷︷︸





The term on the left-hand-side of (6) is an estimate of the adjusted gender pay gap, and is equivalent
to the least squares estimate λ̂ of the Basic model (4). The first term on the right-hand-side of
(6), δ̂a, gives an estimate of how much of the adjusted gender pay gap is accounted for by the
gendered distributions of the unobservable worker-fixed effects (worker-specific and time-invariant
heterogeneity), after partialling out the observable worker, job or firm characteristics in X˜. Similarly,
δ̂ f estimates how much of the adjusted pay gap is accounted for by who works for whom, i.e. by the
gendered conditional distributions of the estimated unobservable firm-fixed effects. Henceforth, we refer
to this as the ‘gender-firm sorting effect’.14 We can also write this effect as follows:
δ̂ f = Eit
[




φ˜J(it) | i ∈ F, X˜β˜
]
, (7)
where M and F denote the sets of men and women in N, respectively. The final term in (6) is equal




= 0. If in the
expression for γ ′ we replace all occurrences of X˜ with X (i.e. if we assume that the Basic wages model
does not include any time-invariant factors: W and Z are equal to 0), then Equation (6) accounts for the
role of all estimated worker or firm time-invariant heterogeneity, as per the application by CGP: i.e. the
gender-firm sorting effect becomes
= Eit
[




φ̂J(it) | i ∈ F, Xβ
]
.
Consistent with the AKM-type models being characterised by firm switching, estimates of the fixed
effects obtained from our Full model are only comparable within connected sets of workers and firms
(Abowd et al., 2002). Therefore, as already mentioned, in our analysis we restrict attention only to the
largest identified connected set in the panel dataset. Nonetheless, this still means estimating a large
number of coefficients, (k+P+L−2), for the Full model.15
It is important to acknowledge that the key assumptions of the AKM model have been criticised as
being unrealistic (see for a summary Card et al., 2018). Most significantly, the interpretation of the firm
fixed effects in the model, as allowing for consistent estimates of firm-specific wage premiums, which
workers gain or lose symmetrically upon switching firms, relies on a strong assumption that the mobility
of workers is exogenous, conditional on all observable and unobservable factors. This is equivalent
to the assumption that the vector of model errors ε is orthogonal to X, A and F. For example, OLS
estimates of the fixed effects would be biased if employees switch firms when they experience shocks
to the match-specific component of their wages, which in our Full model is assumed away within the
residual εit .16 However, this is not to say that the mobility implied by AKM-type models needs to be
completely random. Worker-firm matching based on the worker or firm fixed components of wages, any
14We use the term sorting here loosely, and only to make our discussion of the results more concise. We caveat this label
because of recent theoretical (e.g. Eeckhout and Kircher, 2011) and quantitative (e.g. Lopes de Melo, 2018) contributions,
which have emphasised the difficulties in identifying general sorting patterns in the labour market using wages data alone; i.e.
there is a danger in inferring too much about the extent of sorting from correlations between estimates of worker and firm fixed
wage effects.
15To implement this, we use the STATA programme of Guimaraes and Portugal (2010).
16We discuss the validity of this assumption in the context of our data and application in Appendix B.
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relevant time-varying observable characteristics controlled for, such as whether a job is full-time, and
non-wage factors, like a firm’s location, can all be correlated with mobility without leading to bias in the
model’s parameter estimates.
It is a well-known feature of AKM-type models that estimates of the worker and firm fixed effects
are estimated with considerable imprecision (Card et al., 2018). This is sure to be the case here when
we only have data on average for around 1% percent of the employees in a firm in any given year,
and only for a relatively small number of years in total. This can cause issues in some applications,
especially those that seek to decompose the variance of wages.17 However, as noted by CGP, both the
Oaxaca-style and Gelbach decompositions should satisfy large sample properties, since they use the full
sets of estimated fixed effects. The only concern would be if the sampling errors in the estimated worker
and firm fixed wage effects systematically differed by gender, though we have no reason to suspect this
given that the workers in the ASHE are truly sampled at random.
4 Main Results
4.1 Estimating the Full wages model & decomposition of the raw pay gap
Table 2 summarises the estimation of the AKM-type wages model, described by Equation (1). The
time-varying observable characteristics in X are: year effects, squared and cubed employee age, cubic
polynomials for employee tenure and firm size, and dummy variables for full-time and occupations
(2-digit classification: 26 categories). Columns (1) and (2) show statistics over male and female
worker-year observations, respectively, whereas column (3) combines both genders. The correlation
of the estimated worker and firm fixed effects is negative for men and women, and only slightly positive
overall. However, this is almost sure to be substantially biased downwards given the nature of our sample
and limited mobility bias (Andrews et al., 2008, 2012). One key assumption of the AKM modelling
framework is the additive separability of the worker and firm fixed effects. As a rough test of this
assumption, studies compare the fit of the AKM-type wages model with an equivalent model which
admits instead worker-firm match-specific fixed effects (e.g. Card et al., 2013). When we apply this test
here, we only find a small improvement in model fit, with the adjusted R2 increasing by 2 percentage
points to 0.92, suggesting that the additive separability of the worker and firm fixed effects is a workable
assumption with these data.
For completeness, we also show the results from decomposing the variance in worker wages in the
Analysis sample into component shares accounting for the role of worker and firm fixed wage effects,
their covariance, and other factors in the model.18 We don’t dwell on these results due to the well-known
sources of finite sample bias on these estimated shares, other than to highlight that the firm effects share
17For example, estimates of the covariance between worker and firm fixed effects are biased downwards in finite samples,
whereas the variances of the worker and firm fixed effects are biased upwards. The magnitude of the former bias is inversely
related to the degree of worker mobility observed within a given sample of firms (e.g. Andrews et al., 2008, 2012).
18For the male and female decompositions, the covariance of the residuals with all the estimated factors is not strictly zero,
since the model is estimated gender-blind.
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TABLE 2: Summary of estimated Full wages model with two-way fixed effects & decomposition of raw
gender pay gap: 2002-16
Male Female Total
(1) (2) (3)
St. dev. of log wages - stdit(wit) 0.55 0.49 0.53
N: worker-years 824,806 888,326 1,708,132
P: workers 131,903 124,501 256,404
F : firms 86,779
St. dev. worker effects - stdit(α̂i) 0.45 0.38 0.43
St. dev. firm effects - stdit(φ̂J(it)) 0.2 0.17 0.18
St. dev. observables - stdit(x′itβ̂ ) 0.51 0.43 0.48




Worker effects - varit(α̂i) 0.68 0.60 0.65
Firm effects - varit(φ̂J(it)) 0.13 0.12 0.12
Covariance - 2covarit(α̂i , φ̂J(it)) -0.01 -0.01 0.00
Residuals - varit(εˆit) 0.07 0.09 0.02
Other 0.13 0.19 0.21
Raw gender wage gap decomp. (shares):
Raw gap - Eit [wit | i ∈M]−Eit [wit | i ∈ F ] 0.223
















Notes.- author calculations using the ASHE 2002-16, all employees age 25-64. £2002. Pay excludes overtime. Gap is male
minus female. Estimated Full wages model includes covariates in xit for year fixed effects, squared and cubed terms for
employee age, a cubic polynomial for employee tenure, a cubic polynomial for firm size (n. of employees) and a dummy
variable for whether a worker was employed full-time.
overall is 12%.19 This will include any upwards bias from our small sample setting and estimation errors
for the fixed effects (Krueger and Summers, 1988). Although comparisons are somewhat suspect to the
19Alternatively, including the contribution from the covariance of the fixed effects with other factors in the wages model in
the measure, the share is given by covar(wit , φ̂J(it))/var(wit) = 13.2%.
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data, especially because of different sample sizes and wage measures, this value is towards the lower
end of the range of estimates obtained for other countries using AKM-type models, such as France,
Germany, Portugal and the United States (for a summary see Card et al., 2018). Even so, systematic
differences in firm wage premiums do account for a sizeable fraction of overall UK wage dispersion.
Figure 3 emphasises this further, by plotting kernel density estimates of α̂i and φ̂J(it) by gender. The
male distribution of the firm-specific wage premiums, received by employees in the UK labour market,
is visibly more positively skewed than the female distribution, suggesting that men are disproportionately
more likely to be employed in high-wage firms when compared with women. However, this difference
is small in magnitude, when compared with the differences between the distributions of estimated male
and female worker fixed wage effects.
The raw mean gender pay gap among all employees in the Analysis sample is 22.3 log points.
Besides CGP, the other studies which have estimated a role of worker-firm sorting in gender pay gaps
focus on Oaxaca-style decomposition of the ‘Raw’ or observed gap. These estimates are also based on
AKM-type wages model estimates (see for example Card et al., 2016, among the other studies discussed
and summarised below in Table 7). Table 2 summarises the results of an Oaxaca-style decomposition
for the raw UK pay gap. The vast majority, 84%, is accounted for by the differences in estimated
worker fixed effects. However, the different allocation of men and women to the estimated firm fixed
effects in the UK labour market can still account for 3.6 log points, or 16%, of the raw gender pay gap.
The role of the different occupations which men and women work in is smaller than the firm-specific
component, accounting for 1.3 log points, or 6% of the raw gap. The residuals and remaining observable
characteristics, including tenure, age and full-time status, all together contribute negatively 1.4 log
points, or 6% to the pay gap.
We construct a further graphical representation, which depicts the role of the estimated firm wage
premiums on the hourly wage gap throughout the employee wage distribution. In Figure 4, first we
collect all employees in one percentile bins of the observed real hourly pay distribution in the Analysis
sample. By design, within each percentile bin men and women are approximately paid the same.
Each bin contains several thousand male and female employee-year observations. For example, the
top percentile contains 13,979 male and 3,102 female observations. We then look up the estimates of
worker and firm fixed effects for the employees within a percentile bin, and compute their respective
mean values for that percentile by gender. Within a bin, we subtract the female mean values for each set
of fixed effects from the equivalent male values. These gender gaps (y-axis) are then plotted in Figure 4
for each overall employee wage percentile (x-axis). Initially focusing near the median wage, men and
women, who are earning the most UK-typical rates of hourly pay, are on average working for firms
with similar levels of firm-specific wage premiums. However, among those in relatively low-paid UK
jobs, below the twentieth percentile, the gender gap in firm fixed effects is negative. This implies that
to obtain the same pay as the men at the bottom of the wage distribution, UK women are working in
relatively ‘better’ or higher-wage firms than those men. However, this gender gap is reversed among
those earning close to the ninetieth percentile. Throughout the employee wage distribution, men earning
the same as women have higher contributions to their wages from worker fixed factors, especially among
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FIGURE 3: Distributions over employees of estimated worker- and firm-specific fixed real hourly wage
effects
A. Worker-specific effects - α̂i
B. Firm-specific effects - φ̂J(it)
Notes.- wage effects estimated as per regression model (1) and Table 2, with overall mean values then subtracted. £2002. Both
male and female kernel densities were estimated with a bandwidth of one log point. The top and bottom one percent of the
estimated effects (not gender-specific) are not displayed.
the lowest and highest earners. These factors could include general human capital (transferable across
firms, occupations and industry sectors), accumulated through education choices or work experience,
but could also include the effects of wage discrimination.
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FIGURE 4: Gender gap in the contribution of estimated worker- and firm-specific wage effects
throughout the overall employee hourly wage distribution
Notes.- wage effects estimated as per regression model (1) and Table 2. £2002.
Interpretation: a negative value displayed here for the "Firm effects" implies that women in that portion of the overall employee
wage distribution tend to be employed by higher-wage firms than their male counterparts, on average.
4.1.1 The role of firms within industry sectors, part- or full-time work, and age groups
We can use our estimates of systematic firm wage premiums, from the Full regression model, to explore
the distributions of men and women over relatively high- and low-paying firms for different groups of
jobs in the labour market. Table 3 shows percentiles of φ̂J(it) by gender within these various employee
groups. Appendix Figures C1-C3 represent the equivalent set of results as kernel density estimates.
First, we look within the private and public sectors. In the latter, the distributions of men and women
over firm wage premiums are more similar than in the whole labour market, with only a modest tendency
of men to be working in firms with relatively very high wage premiums. The median firm fixed effect
received by a man in the public sector is 2 log points higher than the median value received by a woman.
The distribution of firm fixed effects in the private sector is more dispersed than in the public sector. The
gender gap in firm fixed effects is low at the bottom of the male and female private sector distributions.
But the median male firm wage premium in the private sector is 9 log points higher than the female
median value, though this gap narrows moving towards the top of the fixed effects distributions.
The ‘Other industry sectors’ group is dominated by the public sector, so the gender distributions
of firm fixed effects are similar to those in the public sector. The male and female distributions over
the firm wage premiums are also relatively similar within the ‘Manufacturing’ and ‘Financial services’
industry groups. However, the gender differences in the ‘Non-financial (sales) services’ group, which is
dominated by retail and hospitality services, are starker. The seventy-fifth and ninetieth percentiles of
15
TABLE 3: Gender gaps at percentiles of estimated firm-specific wage effects (φ̂J(it)) by sector, part- vs.
full- time and age groups
Percentiles
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Overall (all employee-years) 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06
Private 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.04
Public 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Manufacturing 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Non-financ. (sales) services -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.11
Financial services 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
Other ind. sectors 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05
Part-time -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.01
Full-time 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05
Age25-34 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.04
Age 35-44 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07
Age 45-54 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07
Age 55-64 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.07
Notes.- effects estimated as per regression model (1) and Table 2. The derivation of the industry groupings used here is based
on the SIC2003 and described in Appendix A.
the firm wage premiums received by men in this sector are as much as 10-11 log points higher than the
equivalent female figures.
We also look at differences in where men and women work within part- and full-time employment
(Appendix Figure C2). In part-time employment, men are more likely to be employed by a firm with
a very low wage premium than women are. Conversely in full-time employment, men are more likely
to be employed by a firm with a high wage premium than women, but no more so than in the overall
gender distributions over the estimated firm fixed effects.
Finally, we look within age groups. For those aged 25-34, there are only small differences between
men and women in the likelihoods of working for firms with relatively high or low wage premiums. In
this age group, the median firm fixed effect received by a man is 2 log points higher than for women.
These results show some similarities with Manning and Swaffield (2008), who found that in the first
years after entering the labour market the occupation allocation of men and women did not account
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for the widening pattern of the pay gap thereafter. However, our findings suggest it is also the gender
allocation to firms which does not generate large wage gaps among younger workers. But gaps in
representation do open up for the 35-44 age group, and the differences between men and women in
what type of firm they work for then persist up to age 64. The gender gap in the median firm fixed
effect is around 5 log points between ages 35 and 54. The gender representation gaps also widen with
age, with the ninetieth percentile of the firm fixed effects received by men aged 35-64 being around 7
log points higher than the equivalent figure among female employees aged 35-64. Therefore, there is
some evidence that the extent to which men disproportionately work for high wage firms could increase
with age. This would be consistent with recent findings from the United States (Goldin et al., 2017).
Though we must caveat this result here, since the shortness of the sample period studied means we
cannot robustly disentangle birth cohort effects from the life-cycle.
4.2 Applying the Gelbach decomposition to the adjusted pay gap
Table 4 presents our main results from applying the Gelbach decomposition method in different ways
to the same Full model regression estimates summarised by Table 2. In our preferred results, given by
column (3), the adjusted pay gap is 14.5 log points, obtained as the least squares estimate λ̂ from the
Basic wages model, described by equation (4), with the following controls in X˜: year effects, squared
and cubed employee age, cubic polynomials for employee tenure and firm size, and dummy variables for
full-time, private sector, industry groups, occupations (2-digit classification) and employee birth cohorts
(years). Of the 14.5 log points adjusted pay gap, 0.8 log points, or a 5.7% share, is accounted for by the
estimated gender-firm sorting effect, δ̂ f . In other words, in a counterfactual where men and women were
identically distributed across firms and their associated wage premiums, conditional on their different
observable characteristics, the UK gender pay gap would narrow by less than a percentage point: the
remaining 94% of the adjusted gap would still persist from within firms, accounted for by the estimates
of unobserved fixed worker factors, which by definition are transferable across firms.
This measure is somewhat more nuanced than that provided by an Oaxaca-style decomposition.
It first conditions on the role played by the allocation of men and women to any observable fixed
and time-varying worker and firm characteristics. Therefore, the estimate of δ̂ f from the Gelbach
decomposition has, in our view, a very relevant interpretation: it gives an estimate of how much who
works for whom matters, after first conditioning on the fact that men, women, jobs and firms have
different observable characteristics, which are also relevant for explaining a large part of the raw pay
gap. In some sense, it measures the residual role of which workers work for which firms.
Column (2) of Table 4 takes a step backwards from the preferred results in column (3) to a
‘More Basic’ model, showing the results of the adjusted pay gap decomposition when we exclude the
time-invariant worker and firm observable factors from our preferred Basic model. If we don’t control
for employee birth cohorts and pay premiums associated with very broad UK industry sectors, we find
that the amount of the adjusted pay gap contributed by gender-firm sorting increases slightly to 1.1 log
points, or a share of 7.4%. If we don’t address the greater tendency of women to work in the public
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TABLE 4: Main decomposition results for the adjusted log gender pay gap
Most More Preferred Firm &
Basic model Basic model results Occ. sorting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Worker effects - δ̂a 0.183 0.138 0.146 0.148
(0.864) (0.927) (0.943) (0.871)
Gender-firm sorting - δ̂ f 0.034 0.011 0.008 0.012
(0.159) (0.074) (0.057) (0.070)
Gender-occ. sorting - δ̂o 0.012 0.010
(0.056) (0.060)
Other observable chars. - δ̂x -0.017
(-0.079)
Adjusted gap - δ̂y or λ̂ 0.211 0.149 0.145 0.170
Observed gap (mean) 0.223 0.223 0.223 0.223
Notes.- author calculations using the ASHE 2002-16, all employees age 25-64. £2002. Pay excludes overtime. Gap is male
minus female.
Column (1) applies the Gelbach decomposition to the Full model assuming a most Basic wages model. The contribution
presented from ‘Other observable chars.’ gives the contribution, to the associated estimate of the adjusted pay gap, from the
time-varying covariates included in the Full model but not in this most Basic wages model, as described in the text.
Column (2) gives results where the assumed Basic regression model (4) does not include time-invariant employee or firm
characteristics; i.e. X˜ from (4) is identical to X in the Full model.
Column (3) gives results where the assumed Basic regression model (4) does include time-invariant employee or firm
characteristics; i.e. X˜ from (4) is not identical to X in the Full model.
Column (4) gives results where we exclude the 2-digit controls from the Basic model estimated as per column (3), but use
the Gelbach decomposition to account for how much of the Adjusted pay gap is contributed by the gendered distribution over
these occupation effects, as estimated in the Full model, alongside the worker- and firm-specific effects.
Values in parentheses give the share of the Adjusted gap accounted for either by the estimated Worker or Firm fixed effects.
sector, for example, then our conditional estimates of the contribution from gender-firm sorting are
overestimated by a small amount.
Column (1) takes a step even further backwards from the preferred results to a ‘Most Basic’ model.
In this case the adjusted pay gap is 21.1 log points, only a small reduction compared with the raw
pay gap. This estimate is obtained by only controlling for year effects, squared employee age and a
quadratic polynomial for employee tenure. We decompose this measure into four components: the
role of worker effects, gender-firm sorting, gender-occupation sorting, and the contribution from the
allocation of men and women over the additional time-varying covariates we included in column (2)
(a cubic firm size polynomial, full-time work dummy, cubic terms in age and tenure). The estimate
for the share of the adjusted pay gap from gender-firm sorting is then 16%. The share contributed
by gender-occupation sorting is 6%, and the contribution from the time-varying covariates no longer
included in the Basic model is -8%, with the remainder coming from the role of the worker fixed effects.
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Therefore, our estimate of the UK gender-firm sorting effect would be substantially biased upwards by
omitting important time-varying covariates from the Basic wages model.
Finally, in column (4) we present decomposition results comparable to our preferred results, except
here we do exclude occupations from the Basic model and X˜, and account for a ‘gender-occupation
sorting’ effect in a similar manner as in CGP.20 The measured contribution to the adjusted pay gap from
gender-firm sorting in these decompositions increases to 1.2 log points, compared with our main findings
of 0.8 log points. Although UK occupations receive very different rates of pay, gender-occupation
sorting contributes only one percentage point to the pay gap. Together, who men and women work for
and what occupations they are in accounts for 13% of an overall adjusted UK gender pay gap of 17 log
points.
5 Robustness and Further Discussion
This section considers how robust our main results are. We also compare our results to what studies of
the pay gaps in other countries have found, regarding the importance of whom men and women work
for.
5.1 Before and after the 2008/9 recession
As Figure 1 shows, the raw UK gender pay gap decreased by approximately 10-12 log points between
2002 and 2016. It is possible that some of this change could be accounted for by a decline in
the extent of gender-firm sorting. This period also included the 2007-08 financial crisis and a deep
recession. Following 2008 there was a fall in British employee wage inequality, though there was
also an increase in the variance of firm average wages (Schaefer and Singleton, 2017). For firms and
employees who remained economically active during and since the financial crisis, the downturn could
have systematically affected the wages they paid and received. Furthermore, the recession substantially
changed the composition of UK employment and production compared with before (Blundell et al.,
2014). Therefore, to check whether the main results generalise throughout our sample period, we
re-estimate the Full wages model for two sub-periods, allowing all of the parameters to change: first
2002-07, before the financial crisis; and second 2008-16. We then apply the decomposition of the
adjusted gender pay gap within these sub-periods with our preferred version of the Basic wage model.21
Table 5 presents the results, where we repeat for comparison in column (3) our preferred results for
the whole sample period. The estimate of the adjusted pay gap is 15.1 log points in the first sub-period,
compared with 13.6 log points in the second. But, even though the pay gap decreased markedly since
2002, and despite the UK’s Great Recession and the following recovery having had impacts on relative
20CGP excluded covariates for job titles (a very specific classification of occupations) from their Basic wages model, and
then used the Gelbach (2016) decomposition to simultaneously account for contributions to an adjusted pay gap from estimated
sets of worker, firm and job-title fixed effects. Because firms are a collection of occupations, and because we have a smaller
sample of the employees within firms, we prefer to adjust the pay gap for occupational wage premiums before measuring the
contribution from gender-firm sorting.
21Summaries of the Full AKM-type model estimates, as per Table 2, are available on request for each sub-period.
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gender outcomes (Razzu and Singleton, 2016), the estimated contribution from gender-firm sorting was
around 1 log point in both sub-periods. In this regard, our main findings generalise throughout 2002-16,
when we allow for changes through the period in the composition of employment and wages over firms
and workers, and allow for changes in the estimated wage premiums for observable and unobservable
factors.
TABLE 5: Decomposition results for the log gender pay gap: Analysis sample sub-periods
2002-07 2008-16 2002-16
(1) (2) (3)
Worker effects - δ̂a 0.143 0.126 0.137
(0.942) (0.928) (0.943)
Gender-firm sorting - δ̂ f 0.009 0.010 0.008
(0.058) (0.072) (0.057)
Adjusted gap - δ̂y or λ̂ 0.151 0.136 0.145
Observed gap (mean) 0.267 0.201 0.223
Notes.- see Table 4.
Column (3) here presents the same results as Column (3) of Table 4, repeated for comparison.
Column (1) presents equivalent results to Column (3) here, where the sample period is reduced to only employee-year
observations in 2002-07 (N=541,346).
Column (2) similarly presents results where the sample period is reduced to only employee-year observations in 2008-16
(N=1,002,805).
5.2 Occupational classification
Firms can be described by the collections of tasks, jobs and occupations carried out by their employees.
For any given firm this description can change over time. Employees often change occupations when
they switch jobs, either within or between firms. For these reasons, it is important that we account
for occupational wage premiums in the Basic and Full regression models. All the models estimated
in Section 4 included controls for occupations at the 2-digit level of the ONS Standard Occupational
Classification (SOC). This amounts to 26 occupation groups. Information for employees on their 3-digit
occupational classification is also available in the ASHE. In our baseline results, we prefer using the
2-digit groups because there is greater scope for measurement error (spurious occupation switching)
when using a more detailed classification. Nonetheless, in column (1) of Table 6, we confirm that
our preferred results are robust to this modelling choice, when we instead measure the adjusted pay
gap controlling for 92 3-digit occupations groups. The contribution from the gender-firm sorting effect
decreases to 4% of the adjusted pay gap. In column (2) of Table 6, we also show comparable estimates
to column (4) of Table 4. With more detailed occupation controls the contributions to the adjusted
pay gap from gender-firm and gender-occupation sorting increase marginally to 1.3 and 1.2 log points,
respectively.
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TABLE 6: Decomposition results for the log gender pay gap: robustness to occupational classification
Main results Firm and occupation sorting
(1) (2)
Worker effects - δ̂a 0.126 0.146
(0.960) (0.856)
Gender-firm sorting - δ̂ f 0.005 0.013
(0.040) (0.074)
Gender-occ. sorting - δ̂o 0.012
(0.070)
Adjusted gap - δ̂y or λ̂ 0.131 0.170
Observed gap (mean) 0.223 0.223
Notes.- see Table 4.
Column (1) provides equivalent results as Column (3) in Table 4, except here the occupation controls included in the Basic and
Full model were at the 3- rather than 2-digit SOC level.
Column (2), likewise, provides equivalent results as Column (4) in Table 4.
5.3 Comparing our main results with other studies and countries
Several recent analyses have looked at the extent to which the sorting of men and women over firms
contributes to the pay gaps of other countries. As emphasised throughout our previous discussion, the
most comparable set of results to our own are from CGP for Portugal. The observable pay gap over
their sample period was a similar level to that studied here in the United Kingdom. They found that
approximately a fifth of an adjusted Portuguese hourly wage gap was accounted for by gender-firm
sorting, with a further fifth accounted for by gender-job-title sorting.22 These estimates are an order of
magnitude greater than what we find for the United Kingdom in our preferred results. One explanation
is that firms could potentially matter less for overall UK wage variance than in Portugal. There is some
evidence for this, with estimates from an AKM-type model using these Portuguese data showing that as
much as 20% of hourly wage variance there is accounted for by establishment effects (Card et al., 2016,
2018), which compares with about 13% from the estimates of UK firm effects here. Another explanation
for the difference in magnitude between the UK and Portuguese estimates could relate to the sets of
covariates included in the Basic wage models. In CGP, the Basic model included only covariates for
age and age squared, tenure and tenure squared, and year effects. The ‘raw’ observed mean pay gap in
their sample is 24 log points, and the adjusted gap estimated from their Basic model is 23 log points.
Therefore, the estimates from our Most Basic wage model provide a closer comparison (Column (1),
Table 4).23 Our measure of the adjusted pay gap in this Most Basic wage model is 21 log points, which
is similarly close to the observed UK sample average value, 22 log points, as it was in Portugal for CGP.
22These job-titles in the Portuguese data refer to somewhere in the order of 30,000 different groups.
23Though we continue to exclude a linear age term from the model, which we always omitted because of the controls for
birth cohorts in other specifications.
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As already discussed, the estimate we find for the share of the adjusted pay gap from gender-firm sorting
in this specification is 16%, with a further 6% accounted for by gender-occupation sorting. In the UK
case, these greater estimates for the importance of firms in the adjusted pay gap are accounted for by not
conditioning on whether employees work full-time.
Table 7 summarises the main results from five other studies which are closely comparable to our own.
All of these use a common methodological approach. Specifically, the approach taken by Card et al.
(2016) (henceforth CCK), using data from Portugal for the period 2002-2009, has since been followed
closely by Bruns (2016) for Germany, Gallen et al. (2017) for Denmark, Sorkin (2017) for the United
States, and Coudin et al. (2018) for France. CCK and these other studies estimate AKM-type models,
where all coefficients, including the firm fixed effects, can vary by gender. CCK then propose a novel
way to further decompose the contribution to the raw pay gap from gender differences in the estimated
firm fixed effects, into what they call sorting and bargaining components. The sorting component relates
to differences in the firms that men and women work for. The bargaining component is derived from
any differences in the relative firm-specific premiums men and women would receive upon switching
between the exact same firms. This decomposition depends on how the separately estimated sets of
effects by gender are normalised.
CCK find overall that 21% of the Portuguese average pay gap is accounted for by estimates of
the gender-firm fixed effects. Decomposing this further, they show that the sorting and bargaining
components can account for around 15% and 5% of the overall raw pay gap, respectively. Using French
data for the two decades between 1995 and 2014, Coudin et al. (2018) found a positive role for the sorting
component of 11% in the raw French pay gap, but no role for the bargaining component. Bruns (2016)
and Gallen et al. (2017) also found that the sorting component dominated any role for gender wage
bargaining effects in recent decades in Germany and Denmark. For the reasons we explained before, our
results for the contribution to the adjusted, or conditional, UK hourly pay gap from gender-firm sorting
are not directly comparable to the results from these studies. However, our estimate that 16% of the
raw pay gap is accounted for by differences in the allocation of men and women to firm fixed effects is
roughly comparable to the total 21% figure from CCK, with the caveat that this estimate was obtained
without allowing any gender differences in model parameter estimates.
We re-estimate the Full wages model, allowing the parameters on all time-varying observable
characteristics to vary with gender, but keeping the firm fixed effects non-gender-specific. Estimates
of this model are summarised in Appendix Table D1. Compared with our preferred specification, the
model fit is approximately unchanged, as is the share of the raw pay gap accounted for by the firm
fixed wage effects at 16%. The worker fixed effects, however, account for a smaller share when the
parameters on observable characteristics are allowed to vary by gender. Overall, in terms of an estimate
of how much the unconditional sorting over firms contributes to the raw gender pay gap, these UK data



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Besides our preference to account for whether gender-firm sorting contributes to a measure of the
adjusted pay gap, there are two other reasons why we did not apply fully CCK’s approach here. First,
the principal motivation of CCK is more specific than our own. They motivate their decomposition
by an apparent need to reconcile what they identify as two competing strands of literature on how
firms might generate pay gaps: through a sorting or a bargaining channel. In comparison, for the
United Kingdom, we are only motivated by measuring whether gender-firm sorting matters. Second, our
sample is a much smaller share of the population than CCK’s, though it is comparable to the population
share in most of the studies mentioned above which have followed CCK. That said, identification of the
AKM-model depends on connected sets and mobility groups. In these UK data, if we were to estimate
fully gender-specific AKM-type models, as the CCK approach requires, we would begin to rapidly
forego the representativeness of the sample and further diminish the precision with which any firm fixed
effects can be estimated.
It is important to distinguish what type of pay is being studied when comparing estimates on the
importance of firms in gender pay gaps. Of all the studies summarised in Table 7, Sorkin (2017) for the
United States finds the greatest role for sorting effects. Following a similar approach to CCK, he finds
that a quarter of the raw US overall pay gap can be accounted for by the sorting channel. However, this
US study looks at earnings rather than wages, since hours data were unavailable, unlike for Portugal in
CCK’s study. Sorkin suggests that there is a possibility of high- and low-hours firms, and that US men
and women may be sorted on this basis, which could explain why his estimate for the sorting channel is
greater than found by CCK.
There is recent evidence from the United States that there are increasing wage returns from working
longer hours, which men are disproportionately more likely to do (Goldin, 2014; Cortes and Pan, 2016).
If longer working hours are associated with greater rates of pay in the UK, and men are sorted towards
those firms which offer longer hours, then we would expect estimates of the gender-firm sorting effect
to be larger when we decompose the weekly earnings gap. To explore the importance of the chosen UK
pay measure, we replicate our main results, using the same exact Analysis sample of employee-year and
firm observations, and with the same Full and Basic wages models, but instead of log hourly employee
wages being the dependent variable, we replace this with log gross weekly earnings.
The raw gender gap in weekly earnings in the Analysis sample is 49.8 log points. Of this, 6.7 log
points, or 14%, is accounted for by the estimated firm fixed effects (see Appendix Table D2). The
estimate of the covariate-adjusted earnings gap is 17.3 log points. Applying the Gelbach decomposition
to this value, 1.2 log points, or a share of 6.7%, is accounted for by the gender-firm sorting effect
(Column (1), Table 8). Therefore, the estimated influence of where men and women work on the adjusted
weekly earnings gap is of a similar magnitude as it is for the hourly wage gap, despite the far greater
quantity of hours worked by UK men than women (see Table 1). Therefore, at least so far as the UK is
concerned, there is no evidence that the extent to which men and women are sorted towards especially
high- or low-hours firms accounts for a substantial part of why the weekly earnings gap is far greater
than the hourly wage gap. There is however a necessary caveat to this result; the records in the ASHE
given by employers are only for paid hours of work. With these data we cannot rule out the possibility
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that there is gender-firm sorting with regards unpaid hours of work, which if related to rates of hourly
pay or weekly earnings could still account for part of the gender pay gap.
TABLE 8: Decomposition results for the log gender pay gap: the gross weekly earnings gap
Gross weekly earnings Hourly wages
(1) (2)
Worker effects - δ̂a 0.161 0.146
(0.933) (0.943)
Gender-firm sorting - δ̂ f 0.012 0.008
(0.067) (0.057)
Adjusted gap - δ̂y or λ̂ 0.173 0.145
Observed gap (mean) 0.498 0.223
Notes.- see Table 4.
Column (2) presents the same preferred results as Column (3) of Table 4, here repeated for comparison.
Column (1) use the exact same Analysis sample of employee-years and firms, and the same regression models, as used to
estimate our main results, except the dependent variable of these models is now the natural logarithm of real gross weekly
wages, excluding overtime (see also Table D2).
6 Conclusion
Although the UK gender pay gap has decreased steeply in recent decades, it remains large and
significant. A growing literature now highlights the importance of where people work, and especially
for whom they work, in shaping wage inequality. In this study we asked how much of the gender pay
gap, between 2002 and 2016, was accounted for by the differences between men and women in whom
they worked for. For the raw wage gap of 22.3 log points, we found that 16% was explained by the
differences in the estimated firm-specific wage premiums earned by men and women. This was almost
three times the amount accounted for by the differences in the occupations worked by men and women.
We also looked at the role of firms in accounting for an adjusted measure of the gender pay gap of 14.5
log points. We found that the contribution from the gender-firm sorting effect was small after adjusting
for the influence of other observable characteristics of workers, jobs and firms: around one percentage
point, or just 6%, of the adjusted pay gap is accounted for by gender-firm sorting. In other words, if
overnight all gender inequality was wiped out in terms of the firms that people worked for, conditional
on the existing observable differences in relevant worker, job and firm characteristics remaining, such
as tenure full-time status and occupations, then the gender pay gap would only have decreased by this
small amount. The clear majority of what explains the pay gap shows up within firms. Future research
should focus on identifying the worker and firm behaviours which can explain this.
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Appendix A. Further description of the data and sample construction
This section provides additional details regarding the datasets used and how we have constructed
sub-samples and derived variables thereof. The relevant documentation and variable descriptions
attached to these datasets are publicly available from the UK Data Service. The ONS has also published
various documents concerning the data quality and consistency of the ASHE.
We focus on methodological details in the period 2002-16. Throughout these years, the ASHE
is intended to be a true random sample of all employees in employment, irrespective of employment
status, occupation, size of employer etc. Given the legal obligation of employers to respond using
payrolls, the ASHE has always had a consistently high response rate of around 55%. The response rate
for employee jobs is around 60%, implying that for those firms who do respond they tend to provide
complete responses for all their employees in the sampling frame. There is no cumulative attrition from
the panel. Any individual in the sample not included in the ASHE, in any year, for whatever reason,
remains in the sampling frame for the following year. Conditional on a hundred percent response to
the survey, the ASHE would be a truly random one percent sample of employees: all with a National
Insurance number which has a numerical part ending in 14. However, there are three major sources of
under-sampling, one due to firms not responding, and the other two both occurring if individuals do not
have a current tax record. This can happen for some individuals who have recently moved job, or for
those who earn very little (mostly working part-time), and who are therefore not paying income tax or
National Insurance when their employers are looked up by the ONS. For either of these reasons, a worker
would not have (yet) been assigned to an administrative employer reference, known in the UK as a PAYE
number (Pay As You Earn). Therefore, the statistical authority would not be able to find an employer
address to send the survey questionnaire to. From 2004 the ASHE aimed to increasingly sample some
of these employees previously under-represented. It added supplementary data for individuals without a
PAYE reference, and attempted to represent the employees whose jobs would have changed between the
determination of the sampling frame each January and the reference period in April. Nevertheless, the
ASHE datasets remain representative of the employee payments and hours worked in the UK. We view
the dataset as providing on average an approximate one percent sample of the employees within all UK
firms, as a repeated snapshot every April.
From 2005, a new survey questionnaire was introduced for the ASHE, which was intended to
reduce the latitude for employers’ own interpretations of what was being asked of them. From 2007
there were further notable methodology changes. Before, occupations were classified as follows: if
the respondent stated an employee’s job had not changed in the past year, then the previous year’s
occupational classification was applied - otherwise, it was manually coded. Afterwards an automatic
coding, text recognition, tool was used. “The effect of using ACTR was to code more jobs into higher
paying occupations. The jobs that tended to be recoded into these higher paying occupations generally
had lower levels of pay than the jobs already coded to those occupations. Conversely, they tended to
have higher levels of pay than the other jobs in the occupations that they were recoded out of. The impact
of this was to lower the average pay of both the occupation group that they had moved from and that
they had moved to.” In 2007 and 2008 the target sample size of the ASHE was reduced by 20 percent,
with reductions targeted at those industries exhibiting the least variation over time in earnings patterns.
However, the 1% of population sampling frame was reinstated from 2009 onward.
We use the ASHE annual cross-sections for each year from 2002 to 2016 and construct a panel as
follows: in case of multiple jobs per individual, we exclude non-main jobs. In case of missing main
job markers, we impute these based on the job with the highest working hours. In a next step, we
link employees across consecutive years based on their unique personal identifiers. We can also impute
missing enterprise reference numbers (entrefs) backwards, since the ASHE contains a variable which
indicates whether an employee is holding the same job as in the last reference period. After linking two
29
consecutive years in this way, we use local unit identifiers to impute missing entrefs across individuals
within the same year (the ONS states that the local unit identifiers are not consistent across years, but
rather they are created to identify establishments within years). We continue to update missing entrefs
in this way back to and including 2002. While for the years 2003-16 we are only imputing values for a
couple of missing entrefs per year, in 2002 we add a large proportion. We could also impute entrefs in
this way for 1998-2001, but the sample then becomes increasingly unrepresentative of the UK employee
population.
We only keep observations for individuals aged 25-64 in each period, and which have not been
marked as having incurred a loss of pay in the reference period through absence, employment starting in
the period, or short-time working, and which are marked as being at an adult rate of pay (i.e. dropping
trainees and apprenticeships). This is practically the same filter applied by the ONS in their annually
published results on UK “Patterns of Pay” using the ASHE. We drop observations with missing records
for basic hours, gross weekly earnings, or hourly wage rates. Basic hours are intended by the survey to
be a record for an employee in a normal week, excluding overtime and meal breaks. Gross weekly pay
is the main recorded value in the survey, and from this overtime records are subtracted. However, all
other payments received in the period are included within this gross pay, including incentive-related pay
and any premiums for weekend or night work. Hourly wage rates are then derived by the ONS through
dividing by basic hours worked. We drop observations with over a hundred or less than one basic hour
worked, as these could reflect measurement error and the mistaken inclusion of overtime in the usual
hours of work. Full-time is defined as working over thirty basic hours in a week. But there are a tiny
number of discrepancies in some years, we believe relating to teaching contracts, where the definition
applied by the ONS differs. We however recode these such that for all observations the thirty hours
threshold applies. To further address some potential for measurement error, we drop observations whose
derived hourly rate of pay, excluding overtime, is less than eighty percent of the applicable National
Minimum Wage (NMW) each April, allowing for the different age-dependent rates of the NMW over
time (which, in this application, is always the highest adult rate, given that we restrict our attention
to individuals at least 25 years old). We set this threshold lower than the NMW to avoid dropping
observations where employers have rounded pay figures about the NMW, where the degree of rounding
could vary with the actual value of the NMW, a behaviour on the part of employers which has been
hypothesised by the ONS.
To create a tenure variable, we use the recorded employment start date of individuals. The ASHE
contains information on when an employee started working for an enterprise from 2002 onwards. We
drop a tiny number of unrealistic entry dates, where the start date lies in the future, or where it implies
an employee started working aged fifteen or younger. There are some inconsistencies across years in
these records. First, an employee can be employed by the same enterprise for three consecutive years,
holding the same job, but the start dates recorded in the first and third years, though identical, can vary
from the second. In this case we update the “one-off” deviation with the value of the previous year.
Second, if we observe an employee in a chain of consecutive years in the same firm, holding the same
job, but the start dates differ for some years, then we impute the earliest date available. Finally, we
use the employment start date to impute a tiny number of missing entrefs for employees backwards to
2002 again. This allows us to not have to observe employees in a chain of consecutive years to make
imputations. Again, we then use within-year local unit identifiers to update longitudinal entrefs within a
year, for a handful of employees with missing entrefs.
The ASHE contains the number of employees in an enterprise as listed in the administrative
Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR). A small minority of employees in the same enterprise
and year have missing or varying values for this variable. We impute the same value for all employees
within year and enterprise as the modal value for the firm. For 2002-10 occupations are classified
using the four-digit SOC2000, and for 2011-16 using the SOC2010. We use both classifications in
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our analysis, rather than cross-walking. When we use 2-digit occupations as control variables, the
base or excluded category is 41 – Administrative Occupations. When we use 3-digit occupations in
our robustness checks, the excluded category is 211 – Science Professionals. To derive a firm’s time
-invariant industry classification, we first convert ONS Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 2007
to 2003, using files made available by the UK Data Service. This conversion uses the 2008 Annual
Respondents Dataset, where both classifications were applied, and where any 2007 code mapping to
multiple 2003 codes was decided using whichever of the two bore a greater share of economic output.
We then take the modal SIC2003 section (one-digit) classification of the firm in the sample. We then
group industry sectors as follows: Manufacturing/Construction/Engineering, or just “Manufacturing,” is
given by SIC2003 sections C-F; Retail/Wholesale/Services or just “Non-financial (sales) services”, is
given by G-H; ‘Financial services” is given by J-K; and Primary/public/other services, or just “Other”,
is given by A-B, I and L-Q. The Manufacturing sector is the excluded category in the regression models.
We assign each firm to the public or private sector using their modal value in the sample of the ASHE
variable “idbrsta”, which records the legal status of the enterprise according to the IDBR. We assign
“Private” to be private companies, sole proprietors and partnerships, with everything else being Public,
including central government and local authorities. We derive an individual’s birth cohort by taking
their modal value of the dataset year minus their age within the sample, and in the regression models the
excluded category is the earliest cohort. The excluded year effect is for 2002.
The household survey-based pay statistics in Figures 1 and A1 are derived using the longitudinal
British Household Panel Survey (2002-08) and its successor the Understanding Society Survey
(2009-16). They use the Great Britain and Northern Ireland samples and waves, but without any other
boost samples. Years refer to tax years (April-March). Some individuals (less than 1%) were interviewed
twice in these periods, in which case we use their first earnings response. The hourly wage is estimated
from responses by employees aged 25-64 for monthly earnings in their main job. It is derived by taking
usual monthly pay, converting this to a weekly figure (multiplying by 3/13), and then dividing by the sum
of usual normal and usual overtime weekly hours. Only observations with usual weekly hours between 1
and 100 hours were used. Hourly wages below 0.8 of the applicable National Minimum Wage rate were
dropped. Any individuals with missing values for pay, hours, age, sex or interview date were excluded
from the statistics.
TABLE A1: Distribution of the number of different jobs held by workers in the Analysis sample (%),
2002-2016
Worker-year weighted Worker weighted
Number of jobs Male Female Total Male Female Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 40.93 40.95 40.94 48.17 48.20 48.18
2 32.61 32.60 32.60 30.52 30.56 30.54
3 16.90 17.01 16.96 14.13 14.16 14.14
4 6.75 6.72 6.73 5.20 5.14 5.17
5 2.12 2.06 2.09 1.52 1.49 1.51
6 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.37 0.38 0.37
7+ 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.09
N / P 824,806 883,326 1,708,132 124,501 131,808 256,304
Notes.- author calculations using the ASHE 2002-16, all employees age 25-64.
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FIGURE A1: Mean and median log real hourly pay of UK men and women, 2002-16
A. Mean
B. Median
Notes.- see Figure 1.
32
FIGURE A2: Distributions of male and female real hourly pay: comparison of Whole UK-representative
ASHE sample with the Analysis sub-sample used for the main results
A. Male
B. Female
Notes.- see Figures 1 & 2
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Appendix B. Robustness of the regression model
A key assumption of the AKM-type models is that the mobility of workers is exogenous to the
unobserved time-varying heterogeneity of the worker-firm match: for example, match-specific shocks
to wages and productivity, which could induce workers to switch between firms. Card et al. (2013,
2016) and Card et al. (2018) have demonstrated how to carry out a simple and transparent test of this
assumption, which we apply to our Analysis sample from the ASHE. This test takes the form of an event
study of how wages change when employees switch between firms. If the assumptions of the AKM-type
Full wages model are correct, as described in the main text, that firms pay proportional wage premiums
to all of their employees, then we would expect to observe that employees who switch from firms where
their co-workers are relatively low-paid (in the economy) would then experience wage increases after
moving to firms where their new co-workers were relatively high-paid, and vice versa. The model also
predicts that the wage gains and losses for employees moving in the different directions between any
two firms should be symmetric. Furthermore, wages before and after switching should be relatively
stable, i.e. firm switching is not driven by a deterioration or an expected future growth in match-specific
quality.
We construct this event study using the Analysis sample of employees as follows. First, we assign
to each employee, in every year, the mean wage among all of his co-workers in the same firm and year
(excluding himself). Then, year-by-year, we assign each employee to the quartile of how relatively
well or poorly paid on average those co-workers were, compared with all the other employees and their
respective co-workers in the economy. Then we select a sample of employee-firm switching events
from within the Analysis sample. For a switch to be included in the event study, an employee must
be observed working in the same firms in the two years before and after their switch took place. We
refer to such employees as ‘switchers’. Throughout the whole sample period, this gives us a sample
of 21,455 switching events. We then define 16 sub-types of event, defined by the co-worker wage
quartiles of the switchers before and after they switched firms. For each of these event types, and the
employee-employer relationships represented by each, we then compute the mean log real hourly wages
of the switchers, conditional on the number of years before or since switching. These statistics are
displayed in Figure B1 and Table B1. For example, in the first panel of the figure below, we plot how, on
average, real hourly wages evolved for switchers who were originally in the lowest quartile for average
co-worker real hourly wages, before they then switched to a different firm. As predicted by the model,
there is a step-change increase in individual employee wages for those who moved to a firm where their
new co-workers were then relatively high-paid. Whereas, those who moved between firms where their
co-workers were similarly low-paid experienced no substantial wage increases. Similarly, in the last
panel below, we can see that among those employees who switched away from firms with co-workers
who were relatively well-paid, individuals then on average experienced larger real hourly wage decreases
if they switched to firms with relatively low-paid co-workers. In other words, Figure B1 shows that
employees do experience step-change wage increases (decreases) when they switch to firms where their
new co-workers are more (less) high-paid than their old co-workers. Furthermore, the magnitude of
these observed average employee wage changes upon firm switching display some symmetry, as is also
predicted by the Full wages model. Also, note that none of the series in any panel of Figure B1 cross, nor
are there noticeably different trends before and after in the average employee wages across the different
types of switching (high to low, high to high, low to low etc.).
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FIGURE B1: An event-study of average employee log real hourly wages before and after switching
firms, depending on the quartile of co-worker average wages in the old and new firms
(continued on the next page)
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(continued from the previous page)
Notes.- “X to Y” indicates the quartile of co-worker wages for employees in their old firm (X), from which they switch to their
new firm (Y). Each event series uses firm switches throughout the ASHE 2002-2016 Analysis sample period. See Table B1 for
a summary of this data.
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TABLE B1: Summary of event-study: Mean log wages of employees two years before switching firms
and two years after, 2002-2016
Quartile to Years since switching 3-year
Quartile Switches % of switches -2 -1 0 1 wage change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1 to 1 3,498 16.30 1.95 1.93 1.95 1.98 0.03
1 to 2 1,073 5.00 2.01 2.03 2.08 2.12 0.10
1 to 3 705 3.29 2.04 2.04 2.15 2.17 0.13
1 to 4 458 2.13 2.19 2.19 2.35 2.35 0.16
2 to 1 931 4.34 2.13 2.14 2.09 2.12 -0.01
2 to 2 1,582 7.37 2.32 2.33 2.34 2.36 0.04
2 to 3 1,660 7.74 2.37 2.37 2.39 2.41 0.05
2 to 4 768 3.5 2.46 2.46 2.53 2.55 0.10
3 to 1 583 2.72 2.22 2.23 2.13 2.16 -0.07
3 to 2 1,018 4.74 2.40 2.42 2.39 2.41 0.01
3 to 3 2,573 11.99 2.45 2.47 2.48 2.50 0.04
3 to 4 1,194 5.57 2.55 2.57 2.62 2.63 0.08
4 to 1 385 1.79 2.40 2.41 2.24 2.24 -0.15
4 to 2 571 2.66 2.51 2.52 2.45 2.48 -0.03
4 to 3 1,249 5.82 2.59 2.60 2.59 2.61 0.02
4 to 4 3,207 14.95 2.78 2.80 2.84 2.87 0.09
Notes.- author calculations using the ASHE 2002-16, all employees age 25-64. £2002. See Figure B1.
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Appendix C. Additional figures
FIGURE C1: Distribution of estimated firm-specific wage effects (φ̂J(it)): employees in the private and
public sectors, and working within groups of industry sectors
A. Private B. Public
C. Manufacturing D. Non-financ. (sales) services
E. Financial services F. Other ind. sectors
Notes.- see Figure 3. Both male and female kernel densities were estimated with a bandwidth of one log point. The top
and bottom one percent of the overall set of estimated firm-specific effects are not displayed in any of the sub-figures. See
Table 3 and Appendix A for descriptions of the industry groupings. In (a), the sample size of employee-years is 580,000 male
and 430,000 female; in (b) 240,000 and 460,000; in (c) 190,000 and 60,000; in (d) 130,000 and 150,000; in (e) 170,000 and
150,000; in (f) 330,000 and 530,000;
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FIGURE C2: Distribution of estimated firm-specific wage effects (φ̂J(it)): employees in part- and
full-time jobs
A. Part-time B. Full-time
Notes.- see Figure 3 and C1. Both male and female kernel densities were estimated with a bandwidth of one log point. The
top and bottom one percent of the overall set of estimated firm-specific effects are not displayed in any of the sub-figures. In
(a), the sample size of employee-years is 70,000 male and 360,000 female; in (b) 760,000 and 520,000.
FIGURE C3: Distribution of estimated firm-specific wage effects (φ̂J(it)): age groups
A. 25-34 B. 35-44
C. 45-54 D. 55-64
Notes.- see Figure 3 and C1. Both male and female kernel densities were estimated with a bandwidth of one log point. The
top and bottom one percent of the overall set of estimated firm-specific effects are not displayed in any of the sub-figures. In
(a), the sample size of employee-years is 220,000 male and 230,000 female; in (b) 250,000 and 260,000; in (c) 230,000 and
260,000; in (d) 130,000 and 130,000.
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Appendix D. Additional tables
TABLE D1: Summary of estimated Full wages model with two-way fixed effects & decomposition of
raw gender pay gap: gender-specific covariate effects
Male Female Total
(1) (2) (3)
St. dev. of log wages - stdit(wit) 0.55 0.49 0.53
N: worker-years 824,806 888,326 1,708,132
P: workers 131,903 124,501 256,404
F : firms 86,779
St. dev. worker effects - stdit(α̂i) 0.46 0.37 0.42
St. dev. firm effects - stdit(φ̂J(it)) 0.20 0.17 0.18
St. dev. observables - stdit(x′itβ̂ ) 0.53 0.46 0.51




Worker effects - varit(α̂i) 0.69 0.57 0.64
Firm effects - varit(φ̂J(it)) 0.13 0.12 0.12
Covariance - 2covarit(α̂i, φ̂J(it)) -0.01 -0.01 0.00
Residuals - varit(εˆit) 0.07 0.09 0.02
Other 0.12 0.22 0.22
Raw gender wage gap decomp. (shares):
Raw gap - Eit [wit | i ∈M]−Eit [wit | i ∈ F ] 0.223














Observable / other 0.00
(0.00)
Notes.- author calculations using the ASHE 2002-16, all employees age 25-64. £2002. Pay excludes overtime.
Gap is male minus female. Estimated Full wages model includes gender-specific covariates in xit for year fixed
effects, squared and cubed terms for employee age, a cubic polynomial for employee tenure, a cubic polynomial
for firm size (n. of employees) and a dummy variable for whether a worker was employed full-time.
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TABLE D2: Summary of estimated Full wages model with two-way fixed effects & decomposition of
raw gender pay gap: weekly earnings
Male Female Total
(1) (2) (3)
St. dev. of log earnings - stdit(wit) 0.63 0.76 0.74
N: worker-years 824,806 888,326 1,708,132
P: workers 131,903 124,501 256,404
F : firms 86,779
St. dev. worker effects - stdit(α̂i) 0.47 0.48 0.49
St. dev. firm effects - stdit(φ̂J(it)) 0.26 0.27 0.27
St. dev. observables - stdit(x′itβ̂ ) 0.60 0.72 0.71




Worker effects - varit(α̂i) 0.56 0.40 0.44
Firm effects - varit(φ̂J(it)) 0.17 0.13 0.13
Covariance - 2covarit(α̂i, φ̂J(it)) -0.12 -0.08 -0.07
Residuals - varit(εˆit) 0.08 0.09 0.04
Other 0.31 0.46 0.46
Raw gender wage gap decomp. (shares):
Raw gap - Eit [wit | i ∈M]−Eit [wit | i ∈ F ]
0.498
















Notes.- see Table 2.
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